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BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Trial Court, reserving for separate hearing
the issue of damages (R. 16, 21), upon the prayer of
plaintiff and respondent (R. 3) enjoined defendants
and appellants from use of the trade name, "Al's
Sporting Goods." On appeal, defendants and appellants (hereafter called defendants) pray that this Court
reverse the judgment below and remand to the Trial
1

Court with the direction to enter judgment of dismissal
against plaintiff and respondent (hereafter called plain.
tiff). Such direction will affect not only the inJ· unction,
but also - because the merits are involved herein_ the
reserved matter of damages.
The evidence at trial was largely undisputed.
Until on or about June 22, 1965, and for somt
time prior thereto, plaintiff had been associated with
the Salt Lake City retail business known as "Al's Sporting Goods" - first, for a short time as the employee
of its founder and his father-in-law, Almer R. Peterson
the "Al" of "Al's"; then, as a partner of Mr. Peterson;' '
and after 1958, as its sole proprietor (R. 18, 19; Tr.
49-51, 79 ;1 Ex. 3, 4, 13). In 1962, "Al's" location was
changed from 134 West South Temple to 220 West
South Temple, where it remained until it was closed
(Tr. 49-50).
During plaintiff's association with "Al's," it offered
merchandise " ( f) or the sportsman - fishing tackle,
hunting equipment, skiing equipment, anything that
relates to sports" (Tr. 49). Such merchandise could be
obtained at other locations (Tr. 52, 160). "Al's" also
engaged in the repair of equipment (Tr. 51). The facili·
ties at "Al's" last place of business under plaintiff were
adapted to these business activities (Tr. 51) .
Plaintiff testified that, during this time. his rela·
All transcript references are to the red page numberds ;m~~
Y
Reporter.
1

by the Clerk, rather than to the page numbers type

2

1

tionship with customers "was more of a personal thing.
These customers turned into friends as well as being
l·ustomers"; also, that he would consult with them con('ernrnU'
their needs (Tr. 52). Seven former customers
.
b
,r plaintiff d/bla "Al's" testified substantially as fol1
'.oiis: l) that plaintiff gave good advice, had a special
rnowledge of the business, was courteous, and afforded
lwn personalized service, or the like (Tr. 78-79, 81,
~5. 88, 90,93, 96) ; ( 2) five of the seven had, at one
tmie or another thought plaintiff's personal name was
·Al" (Tr. 78-79, 82, 89, 90, 94, 96), but those five
bad later learned that such personal name was "Dick"
-a fact the other two had always known (Tr. 79,
82. 88, 90, 94, 96) ; ( 3) one testified, and the others
did not dispute, that the employees of plaintiff were
also helpful (Tr. 86).
1.

The assistant manager of plaintiff d/b/a "Al's"
at the time of trial testified concerning plaintiff's operation (Tr. 145-46). According to his testimony, during
the period June 23, 1964 through June 23, 1965, plaintiff was in the store about fifty percent ( 50 %) of the
time, that he only acted as part of the sales force when
' the other salesmen were busy, that he spent only about
thirty-five percent ( 35 %) of the time he was in the store
on the floor, estimating that plaintiff spent on the floor
of Al's Sporting Goods about fifteen percent (15%) of
the time that the store was open. Further that plaintiff
handled about fifteen percent (15%) of the customers
who came into his store (Tr. 148-151). Further, that in
addition to himself there were two other full-time and
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one to three part-time employees (Tr. 148). Still further
that plaintiff performed neither repairing1k)r instruction
(Tr. 151-52). Finally, that he too - in plaintiff's '
presence - had from time to time been called "Ai' 1
(Tr. 156).
In rebuttal, plaintiff stated that, during the above
indicated period, he had financial problems and "was
out quite a bit trying to take care of these problems,"
but that '' (p) rior to that time I was in the store most
of the time, and during the Christmas season and durinrr0
the busy season, I was practically - there all the time.''
He specified his duties other than selling, consisting of
purchasing, supervising stock and personnel, bookkeep·
ing, arranging financing, and paying and collecting
bills. When he was selling, e.g. during Christmas season,
1964, plaintiff testified that he "sold as much or more ,
merchandise than any person in the store." Plaintiff
stated, "However, this, you hire salesmen to do the
selling." (Tr. 167-69.)
1

During plaintiff's period of financial problems,
in April, 1965, he met with defendants 'Volfe and Mc·
Gillis who discussed the possibility that such defendants
"pay off the creditors and it was suggested by .Mr. )-leGillis possibly they would take half the business and '
I would get the other half" (Tr. 63; see also Tr. 115·
118).
Under date of June 22, 1965, plaintiff "doing busi·
ness under the name of Al's Sporting Goods, as party
4

'ti fii·st part, assigned to Inter Mountain Association
~r Credit )fen for the benefit of creditors:

d 1e

"'All and singular the goods, wares and merdiandise in the store and place of business of the
said party of the first part situated at 220 'Vest
South Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah consisting
of sporting goods and related merchandise to(rether with all fixtures, furniture, tools and appl.,nces used in carrying on said business, and
equity therein and all book accounts and all books
of account and bills receivable, notes and choses
in action due or to become due, and all other
chattels of every name, nature and description,
wheresoever same may be found" (Ex. 1).
Un cross-examination, plaintiff said of his intent:
··:w1ell, I think the Assignment was general and I con-

reyed ev-erything or gave everything to them that
, related to the business" (Tr. 61 ) .
Plaintiff d/h/a "Al's" indebtedness at that time
was approximately $175,000.00 to $180,000.00 (Tr. 62,
13.3). Inter .Mountain, on June 28, 1965, appraised the
furniture, fixtures and equipment of the store at
~6,359.50 and the stock, at cost, at $58,254.33 (Ex. 25).
All accounts receivable were encumbered (Tr. 62).

,
'
'
'

After this time, defendant Wolfe - in line with
the prior negotiations between defendants and plaintiff
- called plaintiff and asked if he and defendant l\IcGillis could talk to him again. Plaintiff answered affirmatirely. In the conference that ensued, plaintiff advised
that he was "all through with this deal," that he had

5

"made an Assignment to the Association of Credit
Men," and that" (a) 11 I want to do is get out and be out •.
of this pressure and leave this business" (Tr. 118 1
Defendants told plaintiff at that time that "in tl~;
particular case now, if they bought it it would be their~
which to me indicated to me I was out in other words''
(Tr. 64).
Plaintiff turned over the keys to "Al's" to the
Inter Mountain Association, and left (Tr. 54).
Under date of July 6, 1965, plaintiff's assignee
for the benefit of creditors caused to be circulated z
Notice of Sale. After listing separately the respectin
valuation above specified of merchandise inventory a:
cost and of fixtures at appraised value, the notice staterJ
that "bids will be accepted for all assets or separate
offers on the merchandise or fixtures," but that ''(w)e'
... reserve the right to reject any and all bids" (Ex.19).
In the name of defendant Wolfe's Sportsman's
Headquarters in which he was a partner (Tr. 113),
defendant \Volfe submitted a bid of $36,428.00 for the
combined merchandise, inventory and fixtures of "Al's
Sporting Goods" (Ex. 20).
On two occasions prior to the opening of bids, plain·
tiff approached defendant Wolfe to discuss "Al's"
(Tr. 64, 122). On the first, plaintiff indicated that he
was available to work at "Al's" if defendants were the
successful bidders (Tr. 122-23) . On the second - the
morning of the bid opening, plaintiff stated that he
discussed with defendant Wolfe - assuming he were

6

essful bidder -

"the probability of being in

tie
•
•
I SU Cc
iness with him at Al's Sportmg Goods and workmg
bus
it )
own there because I felt I could bring a business in"
).
:l
Tr. 6.J.-65). Defendant \Volfe's testimony as to the
IS
1

it

second meeting was that plaintiff "said he was available, that he needs a job and if we were bidders and so
en _ successful bidders, he would like to go to work
there and told me how much he sold and so on and so
forth, and I said, well, we will see what happens" (Tr.
1ZZ-Z3). At this time, defendant 'Volfe did not know
1rhat he was going to do - whether to take the merchanfae to \\'olfe's Sportsman's Headquarters or to open
up· Al's Sporting Goods" (Tr. 126).

S

At the bid opening, the 'Volfe's bid was high
(R. 18). Pursuant thereto, plaintiff's assignee delivered
, to defendant \Yolfe's Sportsman's Headquarters a bill
of sale to " (a) II furniture, fixtures and merchandise as
\ per inYentory list attached hereto and made a part here, of" (Ex. 9, 25), and delivered to defendant \Volf e the
kerto the business location (Tr. 124). When defendants
took possession of the location, left with the merchandise and inventory were the sales tickets, envelopes,
paper sacks and other printed items used to operate
a place of business, as well as trademark forms used
for advertising purposes. Defendants used these items
and the cash register, a part of the fixtures, which
printed on each cash slip the trade name "Al's Sporting
Uoods." Also imprinted with the trade name were purchase agreements, ski wax, and metal and cloth labels.
1.

!Tr. 55, 68, 69, 160-63; Ex. 21-25.)
7

On or before July 17, 1965 defendants reopened
"Al's Sporting Goods" (Tr. 146) . Two persons who
had worked for plaintiff before he terminated the business were employed there. Ads were being placed similar
to the advertising which had been undertaken by plaintiff before he terminated business (Tr. 56-57; Ex.
14-17).

Under date of July 20, 1965, plaintiff through his
agent and attorney, Mr. Fowler, demanded that defendants cease their use of the trade name "Al's Sporting
Goods" in that it was not intended that such tradt
name be included within the assignment for the benefit
of creditors (Ex. 8) .
Also, at or about this time, defendant .McGilfo
attempted to purchase such rights as plaintiff retained
to the name (Tr. 59, 65-66, 127-29).
Under date of July 28, 1965, Inter .Mountain
assigned to defendant Wolfe such rights to the trade
name as it had acquired by reason of the assignment
from plaintiff (Ex. 10).
At the time of the trial, defendants d/b/a "Al's
Sporting Goods" were conducting a "going out of busi·
ness" sale with an eye to termination prior to January 1,
1966 (Tr. 57, 165; Ex. 14-15).

8

1

ARGUlHENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF DOES NOT OWN THE
TRADE NA:\iIE "AL'S SPORTING GOODS"
AXD, HENCE, HAS NO GROUNDS UPON
\\'HICH HE ~IA Y PROPERLY CO.MPLAIN
OF ITS USE BY DEFENDANTS.
A. Plaintiff must recover on the strength of his title.

It is hornbook law that one, to enjoin the use of a
trade name by another, must establish his ownership
uf that name, 52 Am. Jur., Trademarks, Tradenames,
n11d Trade Practices § 148 ..l\Iore particularly, "(t)he
11ght of one who sells a business to prevent the purdrnser from using the old tradename depends on the
extent of property right transferred by the contract of
' mle,'' id. at p. 625. Proof of his title to the name "Al's
Sporting Goods" was, thus, the very root of plaintiff's
burden of proof .

.Although asked to do so by plaintiff ( R. 2) and
, although the basis of each issue framed by the Pretrial
Order (R. 14), the Trial Court made no finding or
conclusion that, at the time of filing the complaint or
of the hearing herein plaintiff had such title ( R. 18-21).
Absent such a finding or conclusion, the injunction was
issued erroneously. In fact, as a matter of law, it must
lie concluded that - at such times - plaintiff had no
surh title, on the strength of which he could rely or,
lience, on which injunctive or other relief could be premised.

9

B. Plaintiff divested himself of title to the trade

narne

by his assignment to the Inter Mountain Association of Credit

Men.

1. The terms of the Assignment eff ccted

fer of the trade name.

the tran~- )

The assignment for the benefit of creditors from
plaintiff to Inter Mountain Association of Credit Men
did not reserve the trade name, but rather conveyed, in
the most sweeping language:
"All and singular the goods, wares and mer·
chandise in the store and place of business fJ!
the said party of the first part, situated at 2211
West South Temple, Salt Lake City, Ctah, co11sisting of sporting goods and related merchandise
together with all fixtures, furniture, tools and
appliances used in carrying on said business, and
equity therein and all book accounts and all books
of account and bills receivable, notes and choses
in action due or to become due, and all other
chattels of every name, nature and description,
wheresoever same may be found." (Emphasis '
supplied.) (Ex. I.)
Such language has uniformly been held to transfer
trade names.
In Dr. S. A. Richmond N ervine Company v. Rich·
mond, 159 U.S. 293, 296 (1895) an assignment for the
benefit of creditors of "all property" carried with it a
trademark which included the assignor corporation's
president's photograph and name. In Hegeman~ Co.
v. Hegeman, 8 Daley l (N.Y. Common Pleas, 1880)
an assignment for the benefit of creditors of "all choses

10

1

1

. ac t·on"
and "all property and effects, of every nature
1
<
and Jescription of ,vhatever name or nature" carried
irith it the trade name "Hegeman & Co." In Bank of
Tomah v. TFarren, 94 'Vis. 151, 68 N.W. 549 (1896)
. 'tssi'rrnment
for the benefit of creditors of "all and
all '
b
singular" the assignor's "lands, tenements, hereditawents, appurtenances, goods, chattels, stock, accounts,
promissory notes, bonds, bills, debts, choses in action,
claims, demands, property, and effects of every kind
md description" empowered the assignee to sell the
building, fixtures, good will and the name of the 'Bank
of Tomah'."
ill

Here, too, the language is that of a general assignment for the benefit of creditors. The rule for such an
assignmeut is stated in the annotation on the subject
found at -1!4< A.L.R. 700:
"A trade mark or tradename which is not personal in its nature constitutes a part of the assets
of the estate of an insolvent, and is treated as
such in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings
and on an assignment for the benefit of creditors.
The right to use a trade mark or tradename which
is assignable will pass on a general assignment in
such proceedings, even though it is not specifically mentioned therein; and one who purchases
the assets of the insolvent gains the same right in
respect to it that the latter had." (Emphasis supplied.)
It is noteworthy that the Utah statute respecting
assignments for the benefit of creditors specifies that
the i1wentory annexed to the assignment "shall not be

11

conclusive as to the amount of the debtor's estate, and
such assignment shall vest in the assignee the title to an11
other property belonging to the debtor at the time ~f
making the assignment, except property exempt froni
execution and insurance upon the life of the assign.
or .... " (Emphasis supplied), 6-1-3 U.C.A., 1953.
Were there any question of the literal adequacr
of the assignment to divest plaintiff of the trade nam;,
the law would accomplish the same end, for it is well
established - under the authorities collected at Point Il
C hereinafter - that the sale or assignment of the
tangible assets of a business automatically carries with
it the trade name of that business. The basis for this :s
apparent. It is sound public policy to encourage assign·
ments for the benefit of creditors. They do not involve
the coercion attendant to bankruptcy. They do afford
a means for the debtor to shed his debts through pro rata
payments.
Creditors should be encouraged to enter into such
assignments. They can best be encouraged if they are
assured that all non-exempt assets pass. That way their
pro ra ta return is higher, and the general acceptabiliry·
of the mechanism is enhanced.
2. The trade name, "Ats Sporting Goods" does not

come within the exception from transfer for pers()71ai
names and marks.
a. In that plaintiff's personal name was not n
part of the trade name, such trade name
could not be "per.wnal."

12

n

Plaintiff does not come within the exception to the
.tde noted in the citation from 44 A.L.R. 706, supra.
i l that some, but not all, "personal" names and marks
r1 , not pass to the assignee of the business with which
1
2
ilJe\' are cunnected.
It should be noted, in order to
ret~in perspective, that the question of whether a trade
!l;Une is "personal" is not restricted to insolvency or ini~Jluntary transfer law. The selfsame inquiry is presented
,11 .\II attempted volitional assignment, for the owner of
·11 crsonal'' trade name cannot assign it voluntarily,
.'ten for a cunsideration, 87 C.J.S., Trade Marks, Trade
,\ 11 mes and Unfair Competition,§ 171 at p. 503. Indeed,
'hc. only case which - on its facts and in its result attords even passing substance to plaintiff's position,
Jfesser v. 11he Fadettes, 168 Mass. 140, 46 N.E. 407
11897) involved an attempted voluntary (not insolvency) assignment of a trade name which was denominated non-transferable because, inter alia, "personal."
Thus, while insolvency case_s in which the "personal" vs.
·impersonal" dichotomy arises sometimes contain highly
charged dictum - e.g. the verbiage of Mattingly v.
Stone, 12 Ky. L. Rep. 72, 12 S.W. 467, 14 S.,V. 47
:1889) that a trade name "remain ( s) to the bankrupt
:is his capital for a new beginning" - the basic question
1Jf whether a given trade name is "personal" is not the
special preserve of insolvents and the law applicable to
'.hem. Nor, therefore, is the "personal name" exception
the product of judiciary sympathy for the insolvent who

/

. ~~e also 6 Am. Jur. 2d, Assignments for Benefit of Creditors,
•• J,
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- having rid himself of his obligations - seeks tort·
e a111
his assets. 3 In other words, the inquiry here presented is
precisely the same as if plaintiff had purported to se 11
voluntarily his business and trade name to a third par\\
and then asserted the trade name did not pass becau;e
it was "personal" to him.

The answer to that inquiry is that the trade rwmf
"Al's Sporting Goods" was not personal to plaintiff /
that a trade name - to be "personal" must contain tlie
personal name of its owner - not the case here - anJ
may not even be "personal" then. With the single and
readily distinguishable exception of Messer v. The Fad
ettes, supra, all case authorities espouse this proposition.
11

The test outlined at Anno., 44 A.L.R. 706, supr:1.
and adopted by the cases, is two-fold:
I. Any trade name which does not contain its oll'n·

er's own name is impersonal.
2. Any trade name which contains the person's own
name is nevertheless impersonal if it has come to signify
a particular grade or variety of goods or a particular
place, rather than that person's own skill in the care.
selection and production of goods.
The second element of the exception is, in the
main, a question offact, 44 A.L.R. 172. The Trial Court
found no such fact in the case at bar.
3 In fact, to the extent the peculiarities of insolvency law play a
role herein they favor defendants, for there is a judicial I?resumfij
tion that an assignor for the benefit of creditors has ass 1 1g~d 404
non-exempt assets, Willmer v. Thomas, 74 Md. 485, 22 A.
•
(1891).

14

Plaintiff in this case would eliminate the first part
f the formula, and assert that an,ij trade name which
'.'.ould be shown to represent to any of the public the skill
of ib owner is "personal,'' a result which would seriously
alter both inso!Yency law aHd the law of voluntary trade
name assignments.
The cases which recognize and define the exception
are gathered at H A.L.R. 711. Save Messer v. The
Fodcttt's. <;upra, and 1Vard-Chandler Bldg. v. Caldwell,
8 Cal. .lpp. :2d 375, -J.7 P.:2d 758 ( 1935), no pertinent
rlerisio11 supplementary of, or subsequent to, the annotation Jin~ been found. Each decision so collected makes
it cJLllte dear that a trade name which is wholly fictitious
in that it embraces the name of someone other than the
;1;s1gnor is not exempt from passage under a general
as~ignment of the physical business with which it is connected.
Prior to direct discussion of the decisions in question, 1t will promote their understanding to examine
their basis. EYery man has a right to conduct his own
business in his own name. It is hornbook law, therefore,
that "a charge of infringement or unfair competition
cannot be predicated upon the bona fide and innocent
use by an indiYidual of his own name in his own business,
eren though such use may incidentally interfere with
or injure the business of another person or organization
ufthesame or similar name," 52 Arn . .Tur., Trademarks,
Trode11a111cs and Trade Practices § 133.
As a eorrolary, the eourts have adopted the rule that
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an insolvency proceeding or voluntary assignment can.
not deprive a man of that right to use his own name l!l·
his own business. It is that principle and no other, wlucli
the exception under examination embraces.
The pertinent decisions are:
(1)

Children's Bootery v. Sutker, 91 }..,la. 60, 107 Su.
345 (1926).

The decision is entirely in point here. In 1920,
Sawilowsky entered the children's shoe, stocking and
accessories business at ll5 J\'Iain Street, Jacksonville,
adopting the trade name "The Children's Bootery." On
August 17, 1922, he was adjudicated an involuntar)'
bankrupt. The proceeding identified the bankrupt as
"Samuel Sawilowsky, trading as Children's Bootery."
Thereafter, at bankruptcy sale, Sutker bought all of
the assets, including the good will and trade name, of
the business and, on September 20, 1922, reopened the
store, continuing to use the trade name "The Children's
Bootery."
Thereafter, Sawilowsky and two associates, formed
a corporation named "The Children's Bootery" and,
under that name, opened up business at 105 Main Street,
Jacksonville. Not unlike the plaintiff herein, Sawilowsky
sought to avoid the negative effects of his insolvency
proceedings while reaping the rewards of the divestiture
of debt. Like plaintiff herein, Sawilowsky's corporation
brought suit against Sutker to enjoin him from using
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tie
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name although he had purchased it from

~awilowsky ·s

'

trustee.

Xot only did Sawilowsky fail in his attempt to
he, his corporation and his associates
11 ~re tJiemseI-res enjoined from use of the trade name.
Although such good will as the business had and as \vas
:ittachecl to its trade name, was the result of Sawilow1n's management prior to his bankruptcy, a point plaintitl' in the case at bar pressed at trial, the Florida Supreme Court, taking note of the exception afforded some
·personal' names in insolvency proceedings, said "the
trade-name now under consideration is not a personal
1Jllt, nnd we are not here concerned with such limitation."
· Sutker ·
dl)Ul 11 ''

(2)

Iov::a Seed Co. v. Dorr, 70 Iowa 481, 30 N.,V. 866
11886).

This is a decision which invokes the "personal"
name exception. C. ,V. Dorr & Co., a seed growing
concern, made an assignment for the benefit of creditors.
The plaintiff purchased the business from Dorr's as1ignee. Later Dorr organized another seed growing
concern, also named C. ,V. Dorr & Co. Plaintiff's prayer
for an injunction prohibiting the use by Dorr of his
rery own name was denied.
The reasons for the denial are instructive. In the
first place, at 30 N.YV. 868, the Iowa Supreme Court

stressed that "C. 'V. Dorr clearly has the right to go
mto business in his own name.
" It also noted that
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seed growing involved personal skill. Therefore, both
tests for application of the personal name exception
had been met: (I) Dorr's personal name was involred
and ( 2) the resultant trade name indicated personai
capability rather than a particular place or a particular .
grade or variety of goods.
(3)

Mattingly v. Stone, supra.
This decision also invokes the "personal" namt
exception. Subsequent to his bankruptcy, Stone, a whis·
key distiller, entered into a contract in which the sole '
consideration passing from him was a trademark he;
had owned prior to his bankruptcy. The trademark was '
"Old W. S. Stone Distillery; M.P.1\-1., Distiller. Hand
made, sour mash whiskey." The buyers sought to rescind·
the contract for lack of consideration, asserting that the
bankruptcy proceedings had taken the trademark from.
Stone and that, therefore, it was not his to pass on.
Rejecting rescission, the court held at 12 S.,V. 469:

"It will be noticed that the words composing
the brand, save the name of the appellee, are
those of common use; and the right of using his
name was a personal one to the appellee, and did
not, therefore, pass to his assignee any more than
would the skill acquired by a merchant from
experience in his business." (Emphasis supplied.)
On rehearing, the court held at 14 S.,V. 48:
"A trade-mark proper is of value, and a su?ject ·.
of commerce. It therefore passes to the assignee
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J\h

of a bankrupt owner. But a distinction is to be
taken, it seems to us, between such a case and
the use of a person's name, merely, which may
be -raluable on account of his honesty and skill."
(Emphasis supplied.)

Here again, Stone's own name was involved. Here
:~:iin, the resultant trade mark indicated personal cap:uilitr rather than a particular place or a particular
,ra<le ,w rnriety of goods. Both elements being met, the
·per~onal" name exception was applied.

llt

IS·

ile '

(4)

Warren v. Warren Thread Co., 134 Mass. 247

he ; (1883).
as
This clecision is primarily interesting because it
1
d illustrates that it is not enough that a trade name or
id' trademark bear the complaining insolvent's own name,
he
out also that it not have significance solely as a particular
m place or a particular grade or variety of goods. 'V arren
attempted to enjoin his assignee for the benefit of credi9: tors, operating the business which was formerly his,
ig from using trademarks previously belonging to him.
re 1\'arren's name appeared upon one of them. Despite
llS
this, the Supreme Judicial Court of :Massachusetts
id refused the injunction even as to it, stating at 134 Mass.
ID
Ill

.)

247--1!8:

"It is apparent upon inspection that these are
not mere personal trade-marks, the use of which
by any other person than the plaintiff would
operate as a fraud upon the public. His name
does not appear upon any of them except one,
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and in that it is a subo~dinate part of the trademark. They are all designs or symbols designating the place or the establishment at which tl
threa~ is manufactur_ed,. and not implying an\e
peculiar personal_ skill _m the plaintiff as tl;t
manufacturer, or unportmg necessarily that it j,
manufactured by him."
·
The Warren decision, thus, is of a kind with Dr.
S. A. Richmond N ervine Co. v. Richmond, supra. and
others cited at 44 A.L.R. 713. If we were here dealinr,
with "Dick's Sporting Goods" or "Peeples' Sporting'
Goods," say, it would impose upon plaintiff the hurdt 11
to show that the name connoted to the public his par·
ticular skills rather than a place or a class of goods, wert
it not to have passed to Inter l\'Iountain along witl1
the business to which it was attached. "\Ve are not, (If
course, here dealing with "Dick's" or with "Peeples'":
Warr en's import herein is, therefore, in demonstrating
what plaintiff had to prove if he could first prove that
his own name was part of the trade name in question.
(5)

Hembold v. Henry T. Hembold Mfg. Co., 53 How.
Pr. 453 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 1877).
The language of this case is expressive of the pur·
pose and nature of the exception accorded, under some
circumstances, the personal name of an insolvent.
Rembold owned the trademark "H. T. Hembold's
Highly Concentrated Compound Fluid Extract of
Buchu." The purchaser of that trademark at his sub·
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equent bankruptcy sale, sought to enJOlll him from
.ng the mark. Relying on cases about the right
Sl
t
bCT~
.
.
.
•
ari
to
use
his
own
name
m
his
own
busmess
11
ot a 1
ma in the manner of Mattingly v. Stone, supra,
:lll d not ei'
tJia;: the remainder of the mark was merely descriptive
__ the court refused the injunction, stating at 53 How.
1

Pr.
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4oO:

''The name of Henry T. Rembold must still
belong to him, to whom his parents gave it. No
law and no court can take it from him. The property which he had acquired belongs to his creditor~, but the name and whatever of character,
good or bad, belong to it, and which he has himself made, are his, and must so continue to be
until he voluntarily parts with them. He has the
right to make any extract he pleases, and to tell
the public by the use of his own name that the
preparation is his, and not that of another, and
neither the plaintiff nor any other person can
place that name upon a preparation not his,
against his will, and deprive him of the use thereof. Such act would not only impose upon others,
but would also be so cruel and outrageous toward him that, as it seems to me, no law and no
court could justify it."
Likewise, the name of Richard C. Peeples, despite
Ills insolvency, must still belong to him, to whom his
parents gave it. But it is not his own name that he seeks
to protect herein. It is that of another person with whom
he wab once associated. He cannot appropriate that
altogether different name in such a manner that in in'
solrency proceedings, it will not pass to his creditors.
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Hegeman

q; Co.

(6)

v. Hcyc11wn, supra.

This case is especially in point. The plaintiff joiuerJ
his father in a pharmacy business run previously by ti"
father. It was styled "Hegeman & Co." Shortly tiiere' .
after, the father died. The son encountered financial rlit'.
:ficulties and executed a general assignment for the benefit of the creditors. The assignee sold the name alotig
with all other assets to defendant's predecessor. Tlte
plaintiff sued to enjoin the use of the name.
The court refused to grant the injunction. It 11 m
held that the trade name acquired its value under, an2
was "personal" to, the father, who was dead, and was i
not "personal" to the son. The court noted that, in the !
exercise of his right to use his own name, the son could
organize a pharmacy named "Hegeman & Co.," but
could not represent that it was the successor of the
former concern. That representation could, howeYer, be
made by the purchaser from the assignee.
1

1

1

It will be perceived that the holding establishes tbm
a name "personal" to one is not therefore "personal" to
an associate succeeding him, a principle directly incon·
sistent with plaintiff's apparent position herein. In
Hegeman, to reach this result - since both father and .
son were named Hegeman - it was necessary to hol<l
that the trade name was a reflection of personal skill ol
the father, but merely descriptive of a particular place•
or of a particular grade or variety of goods as regards
the son. In the case at bar, the second factor is not
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(7)

Matter of Swezey, 62 How. Pr. 215 (N.Y. Common Pleas, 1881), affirmed in part, IO Daley 107 (Ct.
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The names of Almer R. Peterson and Richard
reac lied.
, Peeples are not the same - not even remotely so.
~'betrade name which was "personal" to Peterson, being
. i·n does not, not being Peeples' own, become so to
IJIS 0\ '
Peeples through his prior association with Peterson.

Had the decision of the lower court in Swezey not
been appealed, it would have afforded authority for
plamtiff. Having been appealed, it further fortifies the
position of defendants. Defendants herein have submitted that, in order for an insolvent to retain a trade
name or trademark despite a general assignment for the
benefit of creditors of the business to which that name
attached, the insolvent must demonstrate two things to
make that name or mark "personal," hence exempt from
the assignment. They are: (I) that the person's own
name is involved; and ( 2) that the resultant trade name
or trademark has not come to connote a particular
place or a particular grade or variety of goods. The
theory of plaintiff's argument has been (although the
Trial Court did not find nor conclude) that the disjunctive "or," rather tha1\.the conjunctive "and" should
be used. In that way, he can attempt to raise a question
of fact centering around the second factor, even though
the first is not here satisfied. Both findings must, bv
law, be present to permit the exception, not just on;.
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In Swezey, creditors under a general assignment
for their benefit requested the trial court to order lht
assignor into court to show cause why he continued tr,
use the trademark "Peerless" on carpet wraps as he hau
done prior to the assignment. The court granted that
order. It went further, however, and in the order drafter!
specified that an area of inquiry would be whether tllf
trademark "Peerless" had come to connote the ski!J 01
Swezey, rather than a particular grade or variety of
goods. If it had, he opined, Swezey would retain it u.1
"personal." If not, it would have passed for the benetil
of such creditors.
In a terse opinion on appeal, the appellate court of ·.
Common Pleas mandated the language in question:
stricken from the order, characterizing it as "entirel.r
too broad." Indeed it was, for it overlooked entirely the
important first factor: that the trade name or trademar~
must involve the insolvent's own name.
Subsequent to the action of the appellate court in ·
Swezey, in disallowing the same, no court has alloweJ
an insolvent to exempt from insolvency proceedings a
trademark or trade name adhering to his business and
not involving his own name.
(8)

Bellows v. Bellows, 24 Misc. 482, 53 N.Y.S. 853
( 1898) ; Lowell Lamb ~ Co., Inc., 204 App. Div. 40i ..
198 N.Y.S. 55 (1923) appeal dismissed, 238 N.Y. 57Z.
144 N.E. 897 (1924).
24
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These decisions, which can be treated together, are
dearly within the rules hereinbefore enunciated. In the
tirsl, a general assignment for the benefit of creditors
was held not to have precluded Charles Bellows from
the right "to use his own name." In the latter, a tradee1J mark consisting of a walking animal and the slogan
tllf We are going to Lowell Lamb to be assorted, where
u1 ,1un·alue will be appreciated" did not pass ._.in an
of msolvency proceeding in that: (I) it involved his own
u.1 name: and (2) it referred to his personal skill in grading
etil and sorting furs.
of

ion

Neither case assists plaintiff. Both cases fall square• Ir within the ambit of the rules of law exposited by
· defendant.

~l,r

(9)

he
.r~

Cuttwell v. Lye, 17 Ves. Jr. 336, 34 Eng. Reprint
129 (1810).

in·
eJ

This decision confirmed the right of the insolvent
to use the same trade route after insolvency that he had
used before. This is in line with the established law in
1d
this nation that insolvency proceedings do not bar the
insolvent from returning to his business or profession.
Amechanic, for instance, may go through bankruptcy,
and still remain a mechanic. Nobody disputes the right
13 of plaintiff herein to return to the sporting goods busii, . ness- just as nobody disputed the right of Sawilowsky
10 return to the children's shoeware and stocking busiZ.
ness. The dispute, as in Children's Bootery, is over the
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right of the insolvent to enjoin the use of the trade lldDk
,
attached to his former business establishment.
·
(10)

Cotton v. Gillard,

4<:1<

L.J. Ch. N.S. 90 087h

This decision stands for the proposition that a tra 111
name or trademark cannot exist in gross, i.e. iwlepeti
dently of the business to which it is affixed. Thus,
J\iaster of the Rolls held that the trade name identirie,:
with a sauce recipe did not pass to the trustee in ba 11 \
ruptcy of a person who was not the owner of such recin1.
( 11)

Ward-Chandler Bldg. Co. v. Caldwell, supra.
The question raised by paragraph III of the com·
plaint is whether a trade name, once "personal," can
become "impersonal." II egeman v. Hegeman, supra,
answered the question in the affirmative, i.e. in defen·
dants' favor. So also, in a fact situation more akin totl1t
one here present, does Ward-Chandler Bldg. Co.
At one time, persons named Hudgen conducterl
a business under the trade name "Hudgen's Permanent
'\Vave Shop." They thereafter sold the business, incluJ·
ing the name, to Caldwell. Caldwell, in turn, sold tit·
business and name to Goodman. In speaking of til:
effect of these conveyances and transfers, the court saiJ
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"Originally, the trade-mark which is the sul:· th
ject ~f this lit~g:~tio~ was, presumably,, a pe~·son'.: b~
one, m that it md1cated to the public that L,

1
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personal care and ~kill of the Hudgens w~re
exercised in producmg the goods or rendermg
the services sold. lly the sale of the business and
the trade-mark the latter had become impersonal,
indicating merely that the business was the same
one which had for some time been carried on
under that name."
That, of course, is the case here. While the name
Al's Sporting Goods" may have, during his lifetime,
indicated to the public the personal care and skill of
Almer R. Peterson, it became impersonal as a matter of
Jn\\' when purchased by the plaintiff.
(12}

Messer v. The /l'adettes, supra.

The Messer decision, as noted previously, affords
Ji·
plaintiff the only final decision containing judicial lan311
guage in any way favorable to his position. It concerned
ra. the sale to Messer by one Ethel Atwood, who had
:n· organized the group, of all her "right, title, and interest
\1:
in and to the organization known as the "Fadette
Ladies' Orchestra,' ... together with all rights acquired
le 1 in and to the establishment, name, and trademark m
eni the words of 'Fadette Ladies Orchestra'."
1

ti1

lnt
1iJ

The orchestra members were not parties to the
contract of sale. The buyer sought to enjoin them from
performing under the name "The Fadettes."

The court in denying relief held, quite properly,
ini that the musicians employed by Miss Atwood "could not,
th by her contract of sale, be put in the control of any other
u~
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person, and there was nothing in her relation to tiltn1
that she could convey." The Thirteenth Amendment lri a
the Federal Constitution demanded as much.
Cl

But what of the trade name? Even if that whicli
it signified could not be transferred legally, could it bt sl
effectively assigned in gross. l\!Iodern jurisprudenct SJ
would answer no, on the basis of authorities collected :rt rt
\\'
Point II C hereinafter, and that would settle the matte1.
tl1
In fact, Messer has been cited by this Federal Circuit
+h
(in a case arising in Colorado before creation nf the
to
Tenth Circuit) for the proposition that a trade namt
cannot exist apart from the business with which it i1 :
connected, Everett 0. Fisk~ Co., Inc. v. Fisk Te1u:her's, th
Agency, Inc., 3 F.2d 7, 8 ( 1924). Considered in this
!01
light, the Messer result was undoubtedly correct. ~fos r
Atwood could not effectively assign a trade name in· ~l
dependent of the business with which it was connected, : be
and her attempted assignment of that business was. rei
illegal. Her attempted trade name assignment, being in; ow
gross, was thus equally illegal.
fie

1

The court said, however, " ( s) o far as Ethel Atwood
had any right or ownership in the tradename whicl1
designated the organization under her management, it
was personal to herself, depending upon her personal
reputation and skill, and it was not assignable" (em·
phasis supp lied) . That, standing alone and cited on
a point on which well-established precedent against
· · con·
assignments in gross was already determmative,
stitutes the sole language to which plaintiff can point
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That language is not determinative here. "\Vere it,
. · g' as it did in a voluntary sale, plaintiff could not t lr1 ar1sJil
could it have been determined that the trade name "Al's
c ,ting Goods" reflected his personal reputation and
~pOI
.
hicl1 skill - ]Jave sold it voluntarily to a purchaser of the
t bt sporting goods business to which it attached'. Such .a
enct result, in that context, would be harsh, reducmg as it
~d :rt ironld the sale price, and certainly - under the hypotte1. thetical posed - would not have been contended for by
'cu1t +he plaintiff herein. Such a result would add uncertainty
· the toerery sale of a retail trade name and business in Utah.
wmt TJie }fassachusettes Supreme Judicial Court carefully
it ii skirted this possibility, stating: "The case is not like
her's ' those in which there is a sale of fixed property and a
this local business to which the name belongs, and whose
~l~ss principal features remain unchanged after the sale."
~ m· This case, involving the assignment and sale for the
~ted,: benefit of creditors of a retail outlet, whose features
w~s remained the same after the sale save for the change in
igm ownership personnel, falls within the qualification specified in Messer.
1

mod
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In swnmary, while the result in Messer was correct,

the language upon which plaintiff must depend was
unwarranted, has not been followed as precedent on
slinilar facts and in fact has been cited for the very
point upon which the case should have been, but was
not, decided. Even, however, the judicial panel which
d.ecided Messer would not have upheld plaintiff's posihon herein for the case here is identified in Messer as
·
t
on
JJil ·
ein· wh'ich the trade name would have passed.
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b. Even if the subject trade name could ..1.
•
, Ui11.i:
some circumstances, be held to be "per·8011111
despite its non-inclusion of plaintiff'" .
"jlrr.
sonal name, the undisputed facts compel ti;,
conclusion that it was not" persorw.1" hereni

Even were it held - contrary, defendants belier
to the distinct mainstreams of authority -- that plainti;
could assert that "Al's Sporting Goods," although
containing his personal name, was "personal" to bin.
the undisputed facts herein compel the conclusion,,
a matter of law that it was nevertheless ''impersonal
1111

As has been noted in the next preceding secti1JLl.
to be "personal" - even when continuing its owner 1
own naine - the trade name must have come to signifr.
validly to the general public (not to just six or men
isolated persons willing to testify) the skill of the owner: :
That the signification must be valid and that it mm!i
run to the general public is apparent. \Vere the belie!
in skill invalid - e.g. were the skill of another, say an
employee, in fact involved - the owner could offer m
public assurance that such skill would continue to~'
represented by the name. Were the signification not Iii
the general public, the chance of the public being misle~
by the trade name's transfer would be nil, for the par·
ticularized public knows the individual and places in·
dividual trust in him, not the trade name he has adoptta
· 'ff'':
or acquired (as, patently, was the case with plamti
seven "customer" witnesses - each of whom kne
11
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plaintiff as an individual and, prior to the termination
of his operation of "Al's" as Dick - Tr. 79-96).

Based upon this test, even were the trade name here
t under consideration "Dick's Sporting Goods," the evidence conclusively demonstrates that the trade name
would be impersonal.

1·

1,

The trade name could not have come to signify
ralidly to the general public plaintiff's skill in the seleciion, production or care of goods. Plaintiff himself
negated skill in the selection of goods. In answer to his
counsel's question "was the merchandise carried by you
tssentially merchandise that could be obtained at other
locations!" plaintiff answered " (a) bsolutely" (Tr. 52) .
Xo goods were produced, unless one considers produchon incident to self-loading instruction, and that was
performed by his assistant manager (Tr. 151-52). Care
of damaged merchandise was performed exclusively by
others than plaintiff (Tr. 151). As to undamaged merchandise, plaintiff's quoted response to the effect that
his merchandise essentially could be obtained at other
locations again provides the answer.
1.

1

1

r
,,
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1
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The public face of a retail establishment - its sales
' force - had plaintiff as a part, but only as a part and
no more important to the general public than other salesmen. According to plaintiff, even when he was work!ngregularly as a salesman during busy periods he could
· claim no more than that he "sold as much or more mer', chandise than any person in the store" (Tr. 168). Although the percentage of the time that - prior to his
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financial troubles - plaintiff spent in selling ma 1
Y 1an
been greater than during those troubles, it is clear that
his "back room duties" seriously restricted his tirn e r1,,.
the floor. As plaintiff stated, "you hire salesmen to 1111
the selling" (Tr. 167-69) . Plaintiff hired such salesme
and they - as much as, indeed more than, plaintdf ~
were necessarily the public image of the establishment
11

As submitted previously, the sale through the a,.
signee of plaintiff's business assets herein meets tli
~I esser test that the principal features of the busint1,
to which the name belonged remain the same after tli
sale save for the change in ownership personnel. In r'at
one of plaintiff's major complaints at trial was ,1111;
that: that, under defendants' operation, the busine1,
was essentially unchanged (Tr. 54-57).
On the record, then, the trade name was not ralidhassociated by the general public with any skill of plain·
tiff.

*

*

1

*

The review of authorities herein contained dern·
onstrates forcefully the divestiture by plaintiff's assign· v
ment for the benefit of creditors of his business of Jui
prior rights to the subject trade name. That divestiture c
having been accomplished, plaintiff had no title on tl1t
strength of which he could prevail, and the Trial Courti u
judgment was in error.
n
t
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c.

ban

If plaintiff did not otherwise divest himself of the
e he did so by abandonment.
hat tra de na m '
rir

orJ,,

me11.

~-

ent

~a,.

th

nt1,

· lli
1111·,
11e1,

idh·
.am·

.em·
1gu·
Jui

turr
tlit
irfi

The Trial Court rendered neither findings nor conclusions on this subject, although it was one of the issues
set down for trial (R. 14). Such abandonment should
have been found, for beyond doubt the record herein
demonstrates that plaintiff abandoned simultaneous with
the closing of his business the trade name "Al's Sporting
Goods.'' That record reveals "not only acts indicating
apractical abandonment, but an actual intent to abandon," j;2 Am. Jur., Trademarks, Tradenames and Trade

Practices § 30.

Thus. on direct, plaintiff admitted to the "termination' of his business (Tr. 52). Thus, moreover, plaintiff declared to defendants that " (a) II I want to do is
get out and be out of this pressure and leave this business'' - that he was "all through with this deal" (Tr .
118): testimony which plaintiff did not rebut or otherwise deny. In fact, plaintiff testified that - at the time
of the assignment to Inter Mountain - he "conveyed
everything or gave everything to them that related to
the business" (Tr. 61, emphasis supplied). In contacts
with defendants following the assignment he did not
give present claim to ownership of the name, but rather,
conceded that it was no longer his (Tr. 64-65, 122-23).
Coupled with this was the abandonment of all business
Incidentals - whether or not listed in the inventory and
many bearing the subject trade name - by plaintiff at
the business premises (Tr. 55, 68, 69, 160-63; Ex. 2125)'
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This constituted an unexplained conces ·
•
SIO!i I:
plambff that the name was no longer his • It ,1·.as onJ,·
after defendants commenced using the name , as lle 1,,·
1
led them to believe they could do, that plaintiff assert•
a present right therein; his abandonment, however,
effectual before that date.
•

11

;

POINT II
DEFENDANTS HAD, AT ALL TD!E~
COMPLAINED OF AND AT THE TIMEO!
THE INJUNCTION HEREIN, TITLE Tr,
THE TRADE NA.ME "AL'S SPORTn1
GOODS."
A. The sources of plaintiffs title.

As noted heretofore, the Trial Court did not il!
pose upon plaintiff the duty to prove his title to 11
subject trade name. Rather, it contented itself \1J
finding that defendants had not met the burden I
Trial Court imposed of proving their title. Conclusion
rejects defendants' title by reason of the bill of sale (fa
9, 25) received in the name of Wolfe's Sportsman
Headquarters. Conclusion 2 rejects defendants' titld:
reason of the bill of sale (Ex. IO) received in the naw
of Elliott Wolfe. Conclusion 3 is explicitly inseparaK
from and dependent upon Conclusions I and 2, i.e. Hj
"Al's Sporting Goods" was back in business was Olli
leading in that title to such trade name had not pas)t.
The other conclusions derive from the first three ri
20-21).
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TD1

Although defendants contend herein that the Court
.
rlv shifted such burden, they also contend that
unprope •
.
.
n the law applicable to the undisputed evidence -upo
·
·
· t d f d
'
the Trial Court's determmahons agams
e en ants
title were erroneous. Such title was derived from one
of three alternative sources: (I) the successful bid upon,
and bill of sale received to, the fixtures and inventory
in the name of vVolfe's Sportsman's Headquarters;
(z) the bill of sale received in the name of Elliott Wolfe;
and (3) from adoption by user of the trade name by
defendants following its abandonment either by (a)
plaintiff, or (b) plaintiff's assignee, Inter Mountain
Association of Credit Men.

1ot il!

6. The Bills of Sale received in the respective names of
Wolfe's Sportsman's Headquarters and Elliott Wolfe inured
to the benefit of all defendants.

on

11

s onl,

he lia,.

sert•
r, 111

Jm

E 01

~ Tr:

to 11

The Trial Court found, and there is no reason to
f \l:i
quarrel with its finding, that "upon acquiring the meren f
chandise, furniture and fixtures (of plaintiff's former
JS!Oll b ·
usmess ) the defendants reopened plaintiff's place of
e (fa busmess
·
and continued doing business and holding
;man· themselves out to the public as "Al's Sporting Goods"
itld:
(R. 19-20). Such user of the trade name thus was by
'nam the entire partnership, consisting of all defendants,
1araoi
pursuant to the bill of sale taken in the name of Wolfe's
e. n~ s
portsman's Headquarters and extant at the time of
s Dlli
the bill of sale taken in the name of Elliott
olfe.
1aS)t.

~e ri

vV

No legal difficulty is occasioned by the fact that

such bills of sale were each taken in the name of a partner
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rather than of the partnership. Such muniments of tit]
. 1
.
. .
e St
o bv10us y pertam to matters w1tlun the scope of tlw ,
16
partnership activity, i.e. a retail sporting goods busin . "
That being the case, it is axiomatic that a parte~i. tr:
r1er it
(whether 'Volfe's or Wolfe) - legally debarred frorn'
competing with the partnership of which he was a men1.
her -- took whatever the bill of sale conveyed for tlit tr:
benefit of the partnership, 40 Am. Jur., Partners/ nc
§ 132, and that equity will - if the named partner wrll JZ(
not (which is not the case here) - impose a trust there· Cr
on in the name of the entire partnership, Meinhard,
Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928) - \''
another application of the maxim that "equity regar1I.
as done that which ought to be done."
;
1 11

Exhibits 9 and IO, therefore, lrnve precisely tm
same effect herein as though they both explicitly nameu
all defendants as grantees.
C. The Bill of Sale to defendants of the tangible assets
of "Al's Sporting Goods" effected the transfer of the tradi
name to defendants.

By bill of sale dated July 12, 1965, Inter l\fountam
did "sell, transfer, set over and deliver" to defendant1
"all furniture, fixtures and merchandise as per invento~·
list attached hereto and made a part hereof" (Ex. 9·

It is fundamental to the law of trade names ano
trademarks that they do not er:ist apart from the bmi· tra
. 'Ir fer
ness with which the are connected. As stat ed b~ · ·
.
Justice Sutherland, speakmg
for t h e U Ill't ed State1 &
36

··eme Court in American Foundries v. Robertson,
Sup1
) " 'h
.
.
372 380 ( 1926 : 1 ere is no property m a
tiIt 2utl. l'.::
.J.
'
ie·S) tra de- inark apart from the business or trade in which
title

t11er ,it is employed."
ro1n

ien:·
·\lie
·s/1111

\\ill

iere·

·d ..

'\tie

uneu

asseti
trade

mtau1
dant1

nto~·

x. 9,,

'fhe transfer of a business effects the transfer of its
trade names and trademarks. A formal assignment is
not necessary. The law in this respect is well summarize<l in A nierican Dirigold Corp. v. Dirigold Metals
Cuiporntion, 125 F.2d 446, 453 (6 Cir., 1942):
"The rule of law is well recognized that in a
roluntary sale of a business as an entirety,
trademarks and trade names, which have been
lawfully established and identified with such
business, u:ill pass to one who purchases as a
b.:hole the physical assets, or elements of the business, even thonyh not specifically mentioned in
the conveyance . ...
"The law makes no distinction between
voluntary and involuntary sales, and where the
trademark involved is not in law a personal one
and the transfer is made by operation of law
through bankruptcy or a general assignment for
the benefit of creditors, the courts have held that,
although not specifically mentioned in the proceedings, the trademarks or trade names lawfully
identified with the business pass to one who purchases the business substantially as a whole."
(Emphasis supplied.)

One effect of this dependence of a trade name or
busi· trademark on a business is that neither can be trans1· ~Ir. !erred independent of such business. In Everett 0. Fisk·
State1 &C0., Inc. "'.
..., Fi's'·
tt T eac h er ' s A gency, I nc., supra,

s ana
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a case arising in Colorado, the plaintiff and def d
.
~~
orgamzers had a contract whereby the plaintiff f .
consideration licensed the organizers to use the t~r'
name "F'is k 'f eacher 's A gency. " The organizers repuuaai.1.
ated the contract, but continued to use the name , \\']it[
i·1
they gave to the defendant corporation. The Circu.:
refused to enforce the contract, stating at 3 F.2d S:
"Th~ plaintiff's attempte? license of the rigli·
to use its trade name was meffective, becau~e,
trade name cannot be assigned, except as an uic:
dent of the sale of the business and good ~;::
in connection with which it has been used."

An identical holding by this Court, except tha: ·•
involves a trademark rather than a trade name, is foun1
in Honey Milling Co. v. Salt Lake & JordanMill&Ell·
vator Co .. , 58 Utah 149, 197 Pac. 731 (1921),inwhitl
you stated at 58 Utah 155: "(A) trade mark is nu:
transferable except in connection with some busine·1
or enterprise in which it is used as such .... "

The same rule is put succinctly in Browning Kim:
Co. of N.Y. v. Browning J(ing Co., 176 F.2d 105, rn1
( 3 Cir., 1949) : " ( T) rade marks and good will cannr
be transferred in gross. They are an integral part ol
business and go with a business." To the same effect,)~
American Broadcasting Co. v. Wahl Co., 121 F.2d II:
( 2 Cir., 1941) ; Allegretti v. Allegretti Chocolate Creai
Co., 177 Ill. 129, 52 N.E. 487 ( 1898) ; Wiscon.Yin Wnili
Lilly Butter Co. v. Safer, 182 Wis. 71, 195 N ·W·~·
·1 I
(1923).
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In consequence, one may not sell his business to
danf,
for one lHI.'uer and the trade name thereof to another • buyer,
,
1_

Ward-Chandler Bldr;. v. Cardwell, supra; Children s
puU: Bootery v. Sutker, supra.

traa1

whilr

8:
rigl1·

ause,
n me:d ~;::

tha~ ·•
founi

&Ellwhitl
15. nu:

These cases have received the endorsement of the
Restatement of Torts, § 755.
For this reason, just as on the transfer by plaintiff
io Inter Mountain of the physical assets of the sporting
~oods business he had previously conducted, the good
\\'ill of such business and the trade name Al's Sporting
Goods were also tranferred (see Point I BI) - equally
the sale of the tangible assets of the business to defendants bv Inter _l\Iountain to defendants carried with it
such go~d will and trade name. To hold otherwise, would
be to hold that trade names or trademarks exist independently and are severable in gross from the business
with which they are connected.
c

1Slli1'•

D. The Bill of Sale of the trade name received by defen-

K1m:, dants in the name of Elliott Wolfe was part of the same trans-

mi action as the sale of plaintiff's business assets to defendants
5
' _ and, if such trade name did not pass with the assets, it passed
:annr by such Bill of Sale.

·t ol

There can be no doubt that, if Inter Mountain re!dli: ceived the subject trade name by reason of plaintiff's
)ea1 assignment, defendants and Inter Mountain intended
W!il1 that such trade name be conveyed to the former by the
i1. W latter. The bill of sale received in the name of Elliott
Wolfe (Ex. IO) bespeaks that intention irrefutably.
ct,)~
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Nor does such bill of sale constitute an attem ,
1\.1 ountam
. to assign
. sue1i name m
.
p1bi ti
I n t er ..Lf
gross an 1 ·
•
•
' apar; n1
from the assets of the busmess with which it wa .
S tnp. C<
nected. Those assets had also been sold to def endan,1
0
Even if the sale of assets did not - the authoritie~a·' \
Point II B notwithstanding - carry with it such narut
Exhibit 10 was clearly a part of the self same transactiu:
between Inter .Mountain and defendants. One cannry 11
be considered independently of the other. Both relat, 3
to the same subject matter - the assets and name tn2
once were "Al's Sporting Goods" - and both we1,
within an extremely restricted time range - spannini.
as they did, only 16 days.
Reading the two bills of sale (Ex. 9, IO) together.
the intendment of the parties becomes clear. Inter Jlou11·
tain, having received the business assets of "Al's Spor'.·
ing Goods" including the name, intended to sell at
such assets 4 including such name to defendants.
Such a reading together of documents arising ou1·
of the same transaction is a requisite tool to proper con·
struction. "A writing is interpreted as a whole. and a~
writings forming part of the same transaction are inter·
preted together," Restatement of Contracts, § 235 (c).
To the same effect are Patterson-Ballagh Corp.v.Byron
Jackson Co., 145 F.2d 786 (9 Cir., 1944) andK11
v. U.S., 156 Fed. Supp. 99, aff'd 254 F.2d 8ll (19jii
11

'Vhatever, then, the infirmity as a muniment o:
The sole exception: an automobile which Inter Mountain~·
ranged to sell to plaintiff's wife (Tr. 61, 133).

4
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. le to the trade name of the bill of sale of the assets tit
h. fi .
.
a1, and it is contended there was no s~c m rm1ty .- it was
01
turret·ted and its intendment clarified by the bill of sale
11 t. of" Al'~ Sporting Goods" received in the name of Elliott
01

1

1·

;a \Y olfe.
mt
111

E. If defendants did not otherwise obtain title to the

no: trade name, they did so by appropriation and use following
a!1 abandonment either by plaintiff or by Inter Mountain.
Im

The original ownership of trade names, just as
trademarks. is obtained by business user, 52 Am. Jur.,
ni. Trademarh:s, Tradenames and 1'rade Practices § 22 .
• This was exclusively so at common law, and remains so
ier today despite the enactment of "fictitious name" stau11 lutes, Nielsen v. American Oil Co., 203 F.Supp. 473
Jr:- (D. "Utah, 1962), and of federal trademark legislation,
at 8i C..J.S., Trade Marks, Trade Names, and Unfair
Competition § 169 at p. 494.
·er'.

II

On the evidence, defendants' user of the name,
on· ''Al's Sporting Goods" was patently sufficient to create
a~ original ownership. They conducted a sporting goods
ler· store, advertised and sold under that name. Plaintiff's
'c). very complaint of infringement presupposes a user sufro~ ficient, absent prior appropriation, to create ownership.

oui

111i:

,

ill·

o:
~·

Even if it be concluded that (I) defendants must
defend upon the strength of their title and ( 2) they have
no title to the subject trade name by reason either of
their purchase of the assets of the business to which it
previously adhered, or of the bill of sale to them naming
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such name, there still remains the question of . ,
.
•
.
,
.
\I 1
Je11
II
their user m itself created and constituted thei' t'·
r

1!1.:

The sole obstruction, if any, to such title by ,
in defendants is the prior ownership and user of then:'.
by plaintiff, 52 A.m. Jur., Trademarks, Tradnamesar;
Trade Practices § 26. If, however, the title created~:
that prior user had been extinguished prior to or dur~·. 1
defendants' user, such ownership no longer consbtur1•
a bar.
It is here submitted that defendants' busines~ ,1,
of the trade name, "A.l's Sporting Goods," created1ili'
thereto in them - if they had not otherwise receivea 1
from Inter Mountain - because the prior title, on1 ~
held by plaintiff, had been extinguished either: (1) ~.•
plaintiff's abandonment of it or ( 2) through its abaq
donment by Inter Mountain after such assignee !ii
received the same.
r

1

J

,

c

l

r

F
u

ti

Plaintiff's abandonment, and the basis therefor,ij ii
discussed at length at Point I C heretofore. That ~J p
I Sl
cussion was for the purpose of testing plaintiff's asm',
a1
tion of continued title to the trade name. Such aband@!
ment is here noted not only for that purpose, but a~ 1
for the purpose of demonstrating the strength of deff&I a
dants' title for, because plaintiff so abandoned, def11,: a
• ·1., lo
dants' title by user was not obstructed by the prwn,
such abandoned ownership wo·uld otherwise have nai
I

If, however, plaintiff's assignment for the benefu! tr
of creditors - as detailed at Point I B heretofore- tr
conveyed title to the assignee, and if such title was nl d
42

'I

f rred to defendants by such assignee - despite
:ltl! tlrans etliorities cited in subdivisions •°and C of this
t1. .. tie au
"' J · t ;tis the case that such failure to so transfer,
11\ti 1Olll •
•
.
•
•
' :i:hile in the ·meantime selling the business assets assigned
ia~ · ·i onstituted an aban donmen t and ex t'znguzs
· hments of
a·· t, c
' · the trade name by the assignee which, in turn, obviated
~;; 1 the obstruction p~sed ~l/ such prior title to def end.ants'
("quiJition of an identical trade name by user.
Ult

k

The decision in point is Re J aysee Corset Co., 201
1 ,1, Fed. 779 ( S.D., N. Y., 1911). Therein, one Cohen owned
rill.' a going business which acquired by user trademarks

ill!' consisting of the word ''J aysee" and the letters "J.C."
oni'!I He transferred the business to Corporation A, but did
I)~ not explicitly assign to it the trademarks. Later, Cohen
100q purported to assign to a third person the trademarks
~ in gross. The third person then purported to assign them
to Corporation B. At this juncture, Corporation A went
., into bankruptcy. The trustee in bankruptcy, having disor,,
, di·' posed of the other assets of Corporation A, sought to
I sell the trademarks in gross. Corporation B brought
ism·
' action to enjoin that sale.

l@,
d1

In an opinion reflective of many of the principles
efe&\ applicable to this case, the Court held for Corporation B
e/et and enjoined the trustee as prayed. It reasoned as folion'i lows:

: ah

1

1

na~

(1) Cohen, by selling his business to Corporation A
'
I
t
· as a matter of law ownership of the
enew, rans ferred to 1t

re- trademarks, eYen though such marks were not specificallv
1snr described in the transfer (Points I AI and II C).
.

43

.
( 2) In that Corpor~tion A had already recent
title to the marks, the tlurd party and hence Cor ·
. Bid
' Iefrom C
l"
hon
la no ht
o len.
It·!t ... obviouslq,po~.1
that Cohen's conveyance of the trade-mark Ulla, .
'
CCuL
panied by any business whatever, gave no title tu\ l
assignee, and therefore none in any subsequent grant i
tr. l
(3) Corporation ll's sole right was therefore!, l
user. "'Vhatever rights the present petitioner has in:, v
trade-mark do not in any way depend upon C1JiJfri
assignment but only upon the continued use thm
in the petitioner's business."

( 4) Corporation B's ownership created by userw· ti
not subject to the prior title of the trustee throughC1.i b
poration A through Cohen because the trustee hadav11
doned the same by previously selling off the bu8illr·I
assets independent of the trademarks, and tradeinari.
cannot exist (no more than can trade names) abstrad. C
and apart from such assets. "In due course of time,\~
. ar
trustee sold the goods and chattels of the bankrupt, ri, th
made no attempt to sell the good will of the bankru1:1 as
business, nor the trademark . . . . The effect of. tu~ pl
proceedings by the trustee was to kill the good will in. ar
destroy the trademark .... "
•ot

J aysee Corset is directly in point here. If lnle ~
.Mountain did not sell the trade name, "Al's Spor~. ~
Goods," to defendants, then it sold plaintiff's busin,~j
assets independent thereof. Such an independent~:;
· could not ex1s. t'mg!'!·Iii Ofsti
destroyed the trade name, which
and defendants' right by adoption and business uilres
1

1
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,

.. · Corporation B's said right) was not obstructeu
as
.
rior
but
abandoned
title.
lOt by the P
'
Ir
It should be marked that J aysee Corset stands for
toL l
oposition that such an abandonment does not cause
, tie pr
.
.
01 a rererter of title to the bankrupt or assignee for the
iltr. benefit of creditors. Had that been the case, Corporation
·er 1·il'ould haYe received the trademark back. Rather, it
n:, was held the trademark had been "destroyed." 5
.1\t. uu~c

i!f'

*

*

*

On the foregoing, not only did plaintiff not have
title to the subject trade name at the time here pertinent,
rw but in fact defendants did.
(11

a!~

CONCLUSION
llftl1

Aside from their errors of omission, the Trial
;: Court's Findings of Fact commit error only in one minor
e,,~ and apparently inconsequential respect: they fail to note
t,r'~. that Almer R. Peterson operated "Al's Sporting Goods"
~:as a sole proprietorship prior to his partnership with
plamtiff ('fr. l~). The Conclusions of Law and resultll a1.
ant Decree of Injunction are, however, totally erroneous in that, for the reasons detailed in this brief, plaintiff

rar1

1Dl11-

1
'
Over the disclaimer of counsel for plaintiff, the Trial Court
Dftlil• suggested durmg argument - although subsequently it neither
. ~found nor concluded - that, assuming plaintiff's assignment
iSlil~~t transfer the trade name to Inter Mountain, Inter Mountain's
t la eof assets sans name might ca use such a reverter (Tr. 170-71).
1
SUYhee Corset affords ;:i definitive ans\ver to foat suggestion. Any
giW! Ofcth r~verter from a~signor to assignee of a trade name. after sale
I stitu•e us~ness to which such name appertained would itself cons u~' resu!{ a ransfer of a trade name in gross - an unallowable
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had no title to the subject trade name on the streu
of which he could recover, the Trial Court impro e~
shifted the burden of proof of title to defendant/a i
- even in the perspective of that improper shift-iii
was demonstrated in defendants. For those reasons,!
Decree of Injunction should be reversed and remana
to the Trial Court with a mandate to enter judgme
for defendants on not only the injunctive issue, buta
the reserved question of damages - which resen
question becomes moot if the Decree is so rernsea
its merits.
Respectfully submitted,
Clarence C. N eslen
Kent Shearer
Douglas ,V. Owens
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